CAPEC-672: Malicious Code Implanted During Chip Programming
Attack Pattern ID: 672
Abstraction: Detailed
Status: Draft
Presentation Filter:
Description
During the programming step of chip manufacture, an adversary with access and necessary technical skills maliciously alters a chip’s intended program logic to produce an effect intended by the adversary when the fully manufactured chip is deployed and in operational use. Intended effects can include the ability of the adversary to remotely control a host system to carry out malicious acts.
Likelihood Of Attack
Low
Typical Severity
High
Relationships
This table shows the other attack patterns and high level categories that are related to this attack pattern. These relationships are defined as ChildOf and ParentOf, and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as CanFollow, PeerOf, and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar attack patterns that the user may want to explore.
Nature
Type
ID
Name
ChildOf
Standard Attack Pattern - A standard level attack pattern in CAPEC is focused on a specific methodology or technique used in an attack. It is often seen as a singular piece of a fully executed attack. A standard attack pattern is meant to provide sufficient details to understand the specific technique and how it attempts to accomplish a desired goal. A standard level attack pattern is a specific type of a more abstract meta level attack pattern.
An adversary would need to have access to a foundry’s or chip maker’s development/production environment where programs for specific chips are developed, managed and uploaded into targeted chips prior to distribution or sale.
Skills Required
[Level: Medium]
An adversary needs to be skilled in microprogramming, manipulation of configuration management systems, and in the operation of tools used for the uploading of programs into chips during manufacture. Uploading can be for individual chips or performed on a large scale basis.
Consequences
This table specifies different individual consequences associated with the attack pattern. The Scope identifies the security property that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in their attack. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a pattern will be used to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Scope
Impact
Likelihood
Integrity
Alter Execution Logic
Mitigations
Utilize DMEA’s (Defense Microelectronics Activity) Trusted Foundry Program members for acquisition of microelectronic components.
Ensure that each supplier performing hardware development implements comprehensive, security-focused configuration management of microcode and microcode generating tools and software.
Require that provenance of COTS microelectronic components be known whenever procured.
Conduct detailed vendor assessment before acquiring COTS hardware.
Example Instances
Following a chip’s production process steps of test and verification and validation of chip circuitry, an adversary involved in the generation of microcode defining the chip’s function(s) inserts a malicious instruction that will become part of the chip’s program. When integrated into a system, the chip will produce an effect intended by the adversary.
References
[REF-662] Jeremy Muldavin. "Assuring Microelectronics Innovation for National Security & Economic Competitiveness (MINSEC)". Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering. 2017-11.
Content History
Submissions
Submission Date
Submitter
Organization
2021-06-24
CAPEC Content Team
The MITRE Corporation
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