New to CAPEC? Start Here
Home > CAPEC List > CAPEC-671: Requirements for ASIC Functionality Maliciously Altered (Version 3.5)  

CAPEC-671: Requirements for ASIC Functionality Maliciously Altered

Attack Pattern ID: 671
Abstraction: Detailed
Status: Draft
Presentation Filter:
+ Description
An adversary with access to functional requirements for an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a chip designed/customized for a singular particular use, maliciously alters requirements derived from originating capability needs. In the chip manufacturing process, requirements drive the chip design which, when the chip is fully manufactured, could result in an ASIC which may not meet the user’s needs, contain malicious functionality, or exhibit other anomalous behaviors thereby affecting the intended use of the ASIC.
+ Likelihood Of Attack


+ Typical Severity


+ Relationships
Section HelpThis table shows the other attack patterns and high level categories that are related to this attack pattern. These relationships are defined as ChildOf and ParentOf, and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as CanFollow, PeerOf, and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar attack patterns that the user may want to explore.
ChildOfStandard Attack PatternStandard Attack Pattern - A standard level attack pattern in CAPEC is focused on a specific methodology or technique used in an attack. It is often seen as a singular piece of a fully executed attack. A standard attack pattern is meant to provide sufficient details to understand the specific technique and how it attempts to accomplish a desired goal. A standard level attack pattern is a specific type of a more abstract meta level attack pattern.447Design Alteration
Section HelpThis table shows the views that this attack pattern belongs to and top level categories within that view.
+ Prerequisites
An adversary would need to have access to a foundry’s or chip maker’s requirements management system that stores customer requirements for ASICs, requirements upon which the design of the ASIC is based.
+ Skills Required
[Level: High]
An adversary would need experience in designing chips based on functional requirements in order to manipulate requirements in such a way that deviations would not be detected in subsequent stages of ASIC manufacture and where intended malicious functionality would be available to the adversary once integrated into a system and fielded.
+ Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the attack pattern. The Scope identifies the security property that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in their attack. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a pattern will be used to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Alter Execution Logic
+ Mitigations
Utilize DMEA’s (Defense Microelectronics Activity) Trusted Foundry Program members for acquisition of microelectronic components.
Ensure that each supplier performing hardware development implements comprehensive, security-focused configuration management including for hardware requirements and design.
Require that provenance of COTS microelectronic components be known whenever procured.
Conduct detailed vendor assessment before acquiring COTS hardware.
+ Example Instances
An adversary with access to ASIC functionality requirements for various customers, targets a particular customer’s ordered lot of ASICs by altering its functional requirements such that the ASIC design will result in a manufactured chip that does not meet the customer’s capability needs.
+ References
[REF-661] John F. Miller. "Supply Chain Attack Framework and Attack Patterns". The MITRE Corporation. 2013-12. <>. URL validated: 2021-06-22.
+ Content History
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2021-06-24CAPEC Content TeamThe MITRE Corporation
More information is available — Please select a different filter.
Page Last Updated or Reviewed: June 24, 2021