An attacker subverts an intermediate system used to process XML content and forces the intermediate to modify and/or re-route the processing of the content. XML Routing Detour Attacks are Adversary in the Middle type attacks (CAPEC-94). The attacker compromises or inserts an intermediate system in the processing of the XML message. For example, WS-Routing can be used to specify a series of nodes or intermediaries through which content is passed. If any of the intermediate nodes in this route are compromised by an attacker they could be used for a routing detour attack. From the compromised system the attacker is able to route the XML process to other nodes of their choice and modify the responses so that the normal chain of processing is unaware of the interception. This system can forward the message to an outside entity and hide the forwarding and processing from the legitimate processing systems by altering the header information.
Likelihood Of Attack
This table shows the other attack patterns and high level categories that are related to this attack pattern. These relationships are defined as ChildOf and ParentOf, and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as CanFollow, PeerOf, and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar attack patterns that the user may want to explore.
Meta Attack Pattern - A meta level attack pattern in CAPEC is a decidedly abstract characterization of a specific methodology or technique used in an attack. A meta attack pattern is often void of a specific technology or implementation and is meant to provide an understanding of a high level approach. A meta level attack pattern is a generalization of related group of standard level attack patterns. Meta level attack patterns are particularly useful for architecture and design level threat modeling exercises.
Survey the target: Using command line or an automated tool, an attacker records all instances of web services to process XML requests.
Use automated tool to record all instances to process XML requests or find exposed WSDL.
Use tools to crawl WSDL
Identify SOAP messages that have multiple state processing.: Inspect instance to see whether the XML processing has multiple stages or not.
Inspect the SOAP message routing head to see whether the XML processing has multiple stages or not.
Launch an XML routing detour attack: The attacker injects a bogus routing node (using a WS-Referral service) into the routing table of the XML header of the SOAP message identified in the Explore phase. Thus, the attacker can route the XML message to the attacker controlled node (and access the message contents).
The attacker injects a bogus routing node (using a WS-Referral service) into the routing table of the XML header of the SOAP message
The targeted system must have multiple stages processing of XML content.
To inject a bogus node in the XML routing table
The attacker must be able to insert or compromise a system into the processing path for the transaction.
This table specifies different individual consequences associated with the attack pattern. The Scope identifies the security property that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in their attack. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a pattern will be used to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Bypass Protection Mechanism
Design: Specify maximum number intermediate nodes for the request and require SSL connections with mutual authentication.
Implementation: Use SSL for connections between all parties with mutual authentication.
Here is an example SOAP call from a client, example1.com, to a target, example4.com, via 2 intermediaries, example2.com and example3.com. (note: The client here is not necessarily a 'end user client' but rather the starting point of the XML transaction).
Example SOAP message with routing information in header:
Continuing with this example, the attacker injects a bogus routing node (using a WS-Referral service) into the routing table of the XML header but not access the message directly on the initiator/intermediary node that they have targeted.
Example of WS-Referral based WS-Routing injection of the bogus node route:
Thus, the attacker can route the XML message to the attacker controlled node (and access to the message contents).
A Related Weakness relationship associates a weakness with this attack pattern. Each association implies a weakness that must exist for a given attack to be successful. If multiple weaknesses are associated with the attack pattern, then any of the weaknesses (but not necessarily all) may be present for the attack to be successful. Each related weakness is identified by a CWE identifier.
Externally Controlled Reference to a Resource in Another Sphere
CAPEC mappings to ATT&CK techniques leverage an inheritance model to streamline and minimize direct CAPEC/ATT&CK mappings. Inheritance of a mapping is indicated by text stating that the parent CAPEC has relevant ATT&CK mappings. Note that the ATT&CK Enterprise Framework does not use an inheritance model as part of the mapping to CAPEC.
Relevant to the ATT&CK taxonomy mapping (see parent)