An attacker engages in scanning activity to find vulnerable software versions or types, such as operating system versions or network services. Vulnerable or exploitable network configurations, such as improperly firewalled systems, or misconfigured systems in the DMZ or external network, provide windows of opportunity for an attacker. Common types of vulnerable software include unpatched operating systems or services (e.g FTP, Telnet, SMTP, SNMP) running on open ports that the attacker has identified. Attackers usually begin probing for vulnerable software once the external network has been port scanned and potential targets have been revealed.
Typical Severity
Low
Relationships
This table shows the other attack patterns and high level categories that are related to this attack pattern. These relationships are defined as ChildOf and ParentOf, and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as CanFollow, PeerOf, and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar attack patterns that the user may want to explore.
Nature
Type
ID
Name
ChildOf
Standard Attack Pattern - A standard level attack pattern in CAPEC is focused on a specific methodology or technique used in an attack. It is often seen as a singular piece of a fully executed attack. A standard attack pattern is meant to provide sufficient details to understand the specific technique and how it attempts to accomplish a desired goal. A standard level attack pattern is a specific type of a more abstract meta level attack pattern.
Access to the network on which the targeted system resides.
Software tools used to probe systems over a range of ports and protocols.
Skills Required
[Level: Medium]
To probe a system remotely without detection requires careful planning and patience.
Resources Required
Probing requires the ability to interactively send and receive data from a target, whereas passive listening requires a sufficient understanding of the protocol to analyze a preexisting channel of communication.
Consequences
This table specifies different individual consequences associated with the attack pattern. The Scope identifies the security property that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in their attack. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a pattern will be used to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Scope
Impact
Likelihood
Confidentiality
Other
Confidentiality
Access Control
Authorization
Bypass Protection Mechanism
Hide Activities
Related Weaknesses
A Related Weakness relationship associates a weakness with this attack pattern. Each association implies a weakness that must exist for a given attack to be successful. If multiple weaknesses are associated with the attack pattern, then any of the weaknesses (but not necessarily all) may be present for the attack to be successful. Each related weakness is identified by a CWE identifier.
Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
Taxonomy Mappings
CAPEC mappings to ATT&CK techniques leverage an inheritance model to streamline and minimize direct CAPEC/ATT&CK mappings. Inheritance of a mapping is indicated by text stating that the parent CAPEC has relevant ATT&CK mappings. Note that the ATT&CK Enterprise Framework does not use an inheritance model as part of the mapping to CAPEC.
Relevant to the ATT&CK taxonomy mapping (see
parent
)
References
[REF-33] Stuart McClure, Joel Scambray
and George Kurtz. "Hacking Exposed: Network Security Secrets & Solutions". Chapter 2: Scanning, pg. 56. 6th Edition. McGraw Hill. 2009.
[REF-128] Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Information Processing Techniques Office and
Information Sciences Institute University of Southern California. "RFC793 - Transmission Control Protocol". Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). 1981-09.
<http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc793.html>.
[REF-130] Gordon "Fyodor" Lyon. "The Art of Port Scanning". Volume: 7, Issue. 51. Phrack Magazine. 1997.
<http://phrack.org/issues/51/11.html>.
Content History
Submissions
Submission Date
Submitter
Organization
2014-06-23
(Version 2.6)
CAPEC Content Team
The MITRE Corporation
Modifications
Modification Date
Modifier
Organization
2015-12-07
(Version 2.8)
CAPEC Content Team
The MITRE Corporation
Updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2018-07-31
(Version 2.12)
CAPEC Content Team
The MITRE Corporation
Updated References, Related_Weaknesses
More information is available — Please select a different filter.