An attacker embeds malicious scripts in content that will be served to web
browsers. The goal of the attack is for the target software, the client-side
browser, to execute the script with the users' privilege level.
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that are
brought on by allowing remote hosts to execute code and scripts. Web
browsers, for example, have some simple security controls in place, but if a
remote attacker is allowed to execute scripts (through injecting them in to
user-generated content like bulletin boards) then these controls may be
bypassed. Further, these attacks are very difficult for an end user to
detect.
Attack Execution Flow
Explore
Survey the application for
user-controllable inputs:
Using a browser or an automated tool, an attacker
follows all public links and actions on a web site.
He records all the links, the forms, the resources
accessed and all other potential entry-points for
the web application.
Attack Step Techniques
ID
Attack Step Technique Description
Environments
1
Use a spidering tool to follow and record
all links and analyze the web pages to find entry
points. Make special note of any links that
include parameters in the URL.
env-Web
2
Use a proxy tool to record all links visited
during a manual traversal of the web
application.
env-Web
3
Use a browser to manually explore the
website and analyze how it is constructed. Many
browsers' plugins are available to facilitate the
analysis or automate the discovery.
env-Web
Indicators
ID
type
Indicator Description
Environments
1
Positive
Inputs are used by the application or the
browser (DOM)
env-Web
2
Inconclusive
Using URL rewriting, parameters may be part
of the URL path.
env-Web
3
Inconclusive
No parameters appear to be used on the
current page. Even though none appear, the web
application may still use them if they are
provided.
env-Web
4
Negative
Applications that have only static pages or
that simply present information without accepting
input are unlikely to be susceptible.
env-Web
Outcomes
ID
type
Outcome Description
1
Success
A list of URLs, with their
corresponding parameters (POST, GET, COOKIE, etc.)
is created by the attacker.
2
Success
A list of application user
interface entry fields is created by the
attacker.
3
Success
A list of resources accessed by
the application is created by the
attacker.
Security Controls
ID
type
Security Control Description
1
Detective
Monitor velocity of
page fetching in web logs. Humans who view a page
and select a link from it will click far slower
and far less regularly than tools. Tools make
requests very quickly and the requests are
typically spaced apart regularly (e.g. 0.8 seconds
between them).
2
Detective
Create links on some
pages that are visually hidden from web browsers.
Using IFRAMES, images, or other HTML techniques,
the links can be hidden from web browsing humans,
but visible to spiders and programs. A request for
the page, then, becomes a good predictor of an
automated tool probing the
application.
3
Preventative
Use CAPTCHA to prevent
the use of the application by an automated
tool.
4
Preventative
Actively monitor the
application and either deny or redirect requests
from origins that appear to be
automated.
Experiment
Probe identified potential entry points
for XSS vulnerability:
The attacker uses the entry points gathered in the
"Explore" phase as a target list and injects various
common script payloads to determine if an entry
point actually represents a vulnerability and to
characterize the extent to which the vulnerability
can be exploited.
Attack Step Techniques
ID
Attack Step Technique Description
Environments
1
Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject
script in parameters of known URLs. If possible,
the probe strings contain a unique
identifier.
env-Web
2
Use a proxy tool to record results of manual
input of XSS probes in known URLs.
env-Web
3
Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject
script into UI entry fields. If possible, the
probe strings contain a unique identifier.
env-Web
4
Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject
script into resources accessed by the application.
If possible, the probe strings contain a unique
identifier.
env-Web
Indicators
ID
type
Indicator Description
Environments
1
Positive
The output of pages includes some form of a
URL parameter. E.g.,
?error="<foobar>'(){};=" becomes
"<foobar>'(){}=" in the title of the
web page.
env-Web
2
Positive
Input content becomes part of the web
page.
env-Web
3
Inconclusive
Nothing is returned to the web page. It may
be a stored XSS. The unique identifier from the
probe helps to trace the flow of the possible
XSS.
env-Web
Outcomes
ID
type
Outcome Description
1
Success
The attacker's cross-site
scripting string is repeated back verbatim at some
point in the web site (if not on the same page).
Note that sometimes, the payload might be well
encoded in the page, but wouldn't be encoded at
all in some other section of the same web page
(title, script, etc.)
2
Failure
All HTML-sensitive characters
are consistently re-encoded before being sent to
the web browser.
3
Inconclusive
Some sensitive characters are
consistently encoded, but others are
not.
Security Controls
ID
type
Security Control Description
1
Detective
Monitor input to web
servers (not only GET, but all potential inputs),
application servers, and other HTTP infrastructure
(e.g., load balancers). Alert on standard XSS
probes. The majority of attackers use well known
strings to check for vulnerabilities. Use the same
vulnerability catalogs that hackers
use.
2
Preventative
Apply appropriate
input validation to filter all user-controllable
input of scripting
syntax
3
Preventative
Appropriately encode
all browser output to avoid scripting
syntax
4
Preventative
Actively monitor the
application and either deny or redirect requests
from origins that appear to be generating XSS
probes.
As the attacker succeeds in exploiting the
vulnerability, he can choose to steal user's
credentials in order to reuse or to analyze them
later on.
Attack Step Techniques
ID
Attack Step Technique Description
Environments
1
Develop malicious JavaScript that is
injected through vectors identified during the
Experiment Phase and loaded by the victim's
browser and sends document information to the
attacker.
env-Web
2
Develop malicious JavaScript that injected
through vectors identified during the Experiment
Phase and takes commands from an attacker's server
and then causes the browser to execute
appropriately.
env-Web
Outcomes
ID
type
Outcome Description
1
Success
The attacker gets the user's
cookies or other session
identifiers.
2
Success
The attacker gets the content
of the page the user is
viewing.
3
Success
The attacker causes the user's
browser to visit a page with malicious
content.
Security Controls
ID
type
Security Control Description
1
Detective
Monitor server logs
for scripting
parameters.
2
Detective
Monitor server logs
for referrers. If users are being tricked into
clicking XSS links through forums or other web
postings, their web browsers will be providing
Referrer headers most of the time. These can help
indicate that the actual request is
illegitimate.
3
Preventative
Apply appropriate
input validation to filter all user-controllable
input of scripting
syntax
4
Preventative
Appropriately encode
all browser output to avoid scripting
syntax
5
Preventative
Actively monitor the
application and either deny or redirect requests
from origins that appear to be generating XSS
probes.
Forceful browsing:
When the attacker targets the current application
or another one (through CSRF vulnerabilities), the
user will then be the one who perform the attacks
without being aware of it. These attacks are mostly
targeting application logic flaws, but it can also
be used to create a widespread attack against a
particular website on the user's current network
(Internet or not).
Attack Step Techniques
ID
Attack Step Technique Description
Environments
1
Develop malicious JavaScript that is
injected through vectors identified during the
Experiment Phase and loaded by the victim's
browser and performs actions on the same web
site
env-Web
2
Develop malicious JavaScript that injected
through vectors identified during the Experiment
Phase and takes commands from an attacker's server
and then causes the browser to execute request to
other web sites (especially the web applications
that have CSRF vulnerabilities).
env-Web
Outcomes
ID
type
Outcome Description
1
Success
The attacker indirectly
controls the user's browser and makes it
performing actions exploiting
CSRF.
2
Success
The attacker manipulates the
browser through the steps that he designed in his
attack. The user, identified on a website, is now
performing actions he is not aware
of.
Security Controls
ID
type
Security Control Description
1
Detective
Monitor server logs
for scripting
parameters.
2
Detective
Monitor server logs
for referrers. If users are being tricked into
clicking XSS links through forums or other web
postings, their web browsers will be providing
Referrer headers most of the time. These can help
indicate that the actual request is
illegitimate.
3
Preventative
Apply appropriate
input validation to filter all user-controllable
input of scripting
syntax
4
Preventative
Appropriately encode
all browser output to avoid scripting
syntax
5
Preventative
Actively monitor the
application and either deny or redirect requests
from origins that appear to be generating XSS
probes.
Content spoofing:
By manipulating the content, the attacker targets
the information that the user would like to get from
the website.
Attack Step Techniques
ID
Attack Step Technique Description
Environments
1
Develop malicious JavaScript that is
injected through vectors identified during the
Experiment Phase and loaded by the victim's
browser and exposes attacker-modified invalid
information to the user on the current web
page.
env-Web
Outcomes
ID
type
Outcome Description
1
Success
The user sees a page containing
wrong information
Security Controls
ID
type
Security Control Description
1
Detective
Monitor server logs
for scripting
parameters.
2
Detective
Monitor server logs
for referrers. If users are being tricked into
clicking XSS links through forums or other web
postings, their web browsers will be providing
Referrer headers most of the time. These can help
indicate that the actual request is
illegitimate.
3
Preventative
Apply appropriate
input validation to filter all user-controllable
input of scripting
syntax
4
Preventative
Appropriately encode
all browser output to avoid scripting
syntax
5
Preventative
Actively monitor the
application and either deny or redirect requests
from origins that appear to be generating XSS
probes.
Attack Prerequisites
Target client software must be a client that allows scripting
communication from remote hosts, such as a Javascript-enabled Web
Browser
Typical Likelihood of Exploit
Likelihood: High
Methods of Attack
Injection
Modification of Resources
Protocol Manipulation
Examples-Instances
Description
Classic phishing attacks lure users to click on content that appears
trustworthy, such as logos, and links that seem to go to their trusted
financial institutions and online auction sites. But instead the
attacker appends malicious scripts into the otherwise innocent appearing
resources. The HTML source for a standard phishing attack looks like
this
When the user clicks the link, the appended script also executes on
the local user's machine.
Attacker Skills or Knowledge Required
Skill or Knowledge Level: Low
To achieve a redirection and use of less trusted source, an attacker
can simply place a script in bulletin board, blog, wiki, or other
user-generated content site that are echoed back to other client
machines.
Skill or Knowledge Level: High
Exploiting a client side vulnerability to inject malicious scripts
into the browser's executable process.
Resources Required
Ability to deploy a custom hostile service for access by targeted clients.
Ability to communicate synchronously or asynchronously with client
machine
Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side
scripting.
Design: Utilize strict type, character, and encoding enforcement
Design: Server side developers should not proxy content via XHR or other
means, if a http proxy for remote content is setup on the server side, the
client's browser has no way of discerning where the data is originating
from.
Implementation: Ensure all content that is delivered to client is
sanitized against an acceptable content specification.
Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content.
Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content.
Implementation: Session tokens for specific host
Implementation: Patching software. There are many attack vectors for XSS
on the client side and the server side. Many vulnerabilities are fixed in
service packs for browser, web servers, and plug in technologies, staying
current on patch release that deal with XSS countermeasures mitigates
this.
Attack Motivation-Consequences
Run Arbitrary Code
Data Modification
Information Leakage
Injection Vector
Malicious input delivered through standard content (containing scripts) that
is sent to the user's machine, for example HTML page containing
Javascript.
Payload
Varies with instantiation of attack pattern. Malicious script payload may be
appended to end of legitimate looking link
Activation Zone
Client browser, its component libraries, and client network (e..g
Intranet)
Payload Activation Impact
Enables attacker to execute scripts to launch attacks on remote client machine
and environment. Intranet and local systems may not be patched to the same
degree as "externally" facing systems, so simple attacks may identify more
victims on an "internal" system such as a corporate Intranet
Vision and Technical Leadership provided by Cigital, Inc.
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