Home > CAPEC List > CAPEC-617: Cellular Rogue Base Station (Version 3.0)  

CAPEC-617: Cellular Rogue Base Station

Attack Pattern ID: 617
Abstraction: Detailed
Status: Draft
Presentation Filter:
+ Description
In this attack scenario, the attacker imitates a cellular base station with his own “rogue” base station equipment. Since cellular devices connect to whatever station has the strongest signal, the attacker can easily convince a targeted cellular device (e.g. the retransmission device) to talk to the rogue base station.
+ Typical Severity


+ Relationships

The table(s) below shows the other attack patterns and high level categories that are related to this attack pattern. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as CanFollow, PeerOf, and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar attack patterns that the user may want to explore.

+ Relevant to the view "Mechanisms of Attack" (CAPEC-1000)
ChildOfStandard Attack PatternStandard Attack Pattern - A standard level attack pattern in CAPEC is focused on a specific methodology or technique used in an attack. It is often seen as a singular piece of a fully executed attack. A standard attack pattern is meant to provide sufficient details to understand the specific technique and how it attempts to accomplish a desired goal. A standard level attack pattern is a specific type of a more abstract meta level attack pattern.616Establish Rogue Location
+ Prerequisites
+ Skills Required
[Level: Low]
This technique has been demonstrated by amateur hackers and commercial tools and open source projects are available to automate the attack.
+ Consequences

The table below specifies different individual consequences associated with the attack pattern. The Scope identifies the security property that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in their attack. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a pattern will be used to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.

Read Data
+ Mitigations
Passively monitor cellular network connection for real-time threat detection and logging for manual review.
+ Content History
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2015-11-09CAPEC Content TeamThe MITRE Corporation
Modification DateModifierOrganization
2018-07-31CAPEC Content TeamThe MITRE Corporation
Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences

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Page Last Updated or Reviewed: July 31, 2018