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CAPEC-589: DNS Blocking

Attack Pattern ID: 589
Abstraction: Detailed
Status: Draft
Presentation Filter:
+ Description
An adversary intercepts traffic and intentionally drops DNS requests based on content in the request. In this way, the adversary can deny the availability of specific services or content to the user even if the IP address is changed.
+ Relationships

The table(s) below shows the other attack patterns and high level categories that are related to this attack pattern. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as CanFollow, PeerOf, and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar attack patterns that the user may want to explore.

+ Relevant to the view "Mechanisms of Attack" (CAPEC-1000)
NatureTypeIDName
ChildOfStandard Attack PatternStandard Attack Pattern - A standard level attack pattern in CAPEC is focused on a specific methodology or technique used in an attack. It is often seen as a singular piece of a fully executed attack. A standard attack pattern is meant to provide sufficient details to understand the specific technique and how it attempts to accomplish a desired goal. A standard level attack pattern is a specific type of a more abstract meta level attack pattern.603Blockage
+ Prerequisites
This attack requires the ability to conduct deep packet inspection with an In-Path device that can drop the targeted traffic and/or connection.
+ Consequences

The table below specifies different individual consequences associated with the attack pattern. The Scope identifies the security property that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in their attack. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a pattern will be used to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.

ScopeImpactLikelihood
Availability
Other
+ Mitigations

Hard Coded Alternate DNS server in applications

Avoid dependence on DNS

Include "hosts file"/IP address in the application

Ensure best practices with respect to communications channel protections.

Use a .onion domain with Tor support

+ Example Instances

Full URL Based Filtering: Filtering based upon the requested URL.

URL String-based Filtering: Filtering based upon the use of particular strings included in the requested URL.

+ References
[REF-473] "Censorship in the Wild: Analyzing Internet Filtering in Syria". Sigcomm. 2014. <http://conferences2.sigcomm.org/imc/2014/papers/p285.pdf>.
+ Content History
Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2017-01-12Seamus Tuohy

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Page Last Updated or Reviewed: July 31, 2018