Home > CAPEC List > CAPEC-584: BGP Route Disabling (Version 3.0)  

CAPEC-584: BGP Route Disabling

Attack Pattern ID: 584
Abstraction: Detailed
Status: Draft
Presentation Filter:
+ Description
An adversary suppresses the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) advertisement for a route so as to render the underlying network inaccessible. The BGP protocol helps traffic move throughout the Internet by selecting the most efficient route between Autonomous Systems (AS), or routing domains. BGP is the basis for interdomain routing infrastructure, providing connections between these ASs. By suppressing the intended AS routing advertisements and/or forcing less effective routes for traffic to ASs, the adversary can deny availability for the target network.
+ Relationships

The table(s) below shows the other attack patterns and high level categories that are related to this attack pattern. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as CanFollow, PeerOf, and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar attack patterns that the user may want to explore.

+ Relevant to the view "Mechanisms of Attack" (CAPEC-1000)
NatureTypeIDName
ChildOfStandard Attack PatternStandard Attack Pattern - A standard level attack pattern in CAPEC is focused on a specific methodology or technique used in an attack. It is often seen as a singular piece of a fully executed attack. A standard attack pattern is meant to provide sufficient details to understand the specific technique and how it attempts to accomplish a desired goal. A standard level attack pattern is a specific type of a more abstract meta level attack pattern.582Route Disabling
+ Prerequisites
The adversary must have control of a router that can modify, drop, or introduce spoofed BGP updates.The adversary can convince
+ Resources Required
BGP Router
+ Consequences

The table below specifies different individual consequences associated with the attack pattern. The Scope identifies the security property that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in their attack. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a pattern will be used to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.

ScopeImpactLikelihood
Availability
Other
+ Mitigations

Implement Ingress filters to check the validity of received routes. However, this relies on the accuracy of Internet Routing Registries (IRRs) databases which are often not well-maintained.

Implement Secure BGP (S-BGP protocol), which improves authorization and authentication capabilities based on public-key cryptography.

+ Example Instances
Blackholing: The adversary intentionally references false routing advertisements in order to attract traffic to a particular router so it can be dropped.
+ References
[REF-465] "Why is it Taking so Long to Secure Internet Routing?". ACM. 2014. <https://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=2668966>.
[REF-466] "Beware of BGP Attacks". ACM SIGCOMM. 2004. <http://www.cc.gatech.edu/~dovrolis/Papers/ccr-bgp.pdf>.
+ Content History
Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2017-01-12Seamus Tuohy

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Page Last Updated or Reviewed: July 31, 2018