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CAPEC-477: Signature Spoofing by Mixing Signed and Unsigned Content

Attack Pattern ID: 477
Abstraction: Detailed
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+ Description
An attacker exploits the underlying complexity of a data structure that allows for both signed and unsigned content, to cause unsigned data to be processed as though it were signed data.
+ Likelihood Of Attack

Low

+ Typical Severity

High

+ Relationships
Section HelpThis table shows the other attack patterns and high level categories that are related to this attack pattern. These relationships are defined as ChildOf and ParentOf, and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as CanFollow, PeerOf, and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar attack patterns that the user may want to explore.
NatureTypeIDName
ChildOfStandard Attack PatternStandard Attack Pattern - A standard level attack pattern in CAPEC is focused on a specific methodology or technique used in an attack. It is often seen as a singular piece of a fully executed attack. A standard attack pattern is meant to provide sufficient details to understand the specific technique and how it attempts to accomplish a desired goal. A standard level attack pattern is a specific type of a more abstract meta level attack pattern.473Signature Spoof
Section HelpThis table shows the views that this attack pattern belongs to and top level categories within that view.
+ Prerequisites
Signer and recipient are using complex data storage structures that allow for a mix between signed and unsigned data
Recipient is using signature verification software that does not maintain separation between signed and unsigned data once the signature has been verified.
+ Skills Required
[Level: High]
The attacker may need to continuously monitor a stream of signed data, waiting for an exploitable message to appear.
[Level: High]
Attacker must be able to create malformed data blobs and know how to insert them in a location that the recipient will visit.
+ Mitigations
Ensure the application is fully patched and does not allow the processing of unsigned data as if it is signed data.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Section HelpCAPEC mappings to ATT&CK techniques leverage an inheritance model to streamline and minimize direct CAPEC/ATT&CK mappings. Inheritance of a mapping is indicated by text stating that the parent CAPEC has relevant ATT&CK mappings. Note that the ATT&CK Enterprise Framework does not use an inheritance model as part of the mapping to CAPEC.
Relevant to the ATT&CK taxonomy mapping (see parent )
+ Content History
Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2014-06-23
(Version 2.6)
CAPEC Content TeamThe MITRE Corporation
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Page Last Updated or Reviewed: July 31, 2018