Home > CAPEC List > CAPEC-466: Leveraging Active Man in the Middle Attacks to Bypass Same Origin Policy (Version 2.11)  

CAPEC-466: Leveraging Active Man in the Middle Attacks to Bypass Same Origin Policy

 
Leveraging Active Man in the Middle Attacks to Bypass Same Origin Policy
Definition in a New Window Definition in a New Window
Attack Pattern ID: 466
Abstraction: Meta
Status: Draft
Completeness: Stub
Presentation Filter:
+ Summary

An attacker leverages a man in the middle attack in order to bypass the same origin policy protection in the victim's browser. This active man in the middle attack could be launched, for instance, when the victim is connected to a public WIFI hot spot. An attacker is able to intercept requests and responses between the victim's browser and some non-sensitive website that does not use TLS. For instance, the victim may be checking flight or weather information.

When an attacker intercepts a response bound to the victim, an attacker adds an iFrame (which is possibly invisible) to the response referencing some domain with sensitive functionality and forwards the response to the victim. The victim's browser than automatically initiates an unauthorized request to the site with sensitive functionality. The same origin policy would prevent making these requests to a site other than the one from which the Java Script came, but the attacker once again uses active man in the middle to intercept these automatic requests and redirect them to the domain / service with sensitive functionality. Any persistent cookies that the victim has in his or her browser would be used for these unauthorized requests. The attacker thus actively directs the victim to a site with sensitive functionality.

When the site with sensitive functionality responds back to the victim's request, an active man in the middle attacker intercepts these responses, injects his or her own malicious Java Script into these responses, and forwards to the victim's browser. In the victim's browser, that Java Script executes under the restrictions of the site with sensitive functionality and can essentially be used to continue to interact with the sensitive site. So an attacker can execute scripts within the victim's browser on any domains the attacker desires.

The attacker is able to use this technique to steal cookies from the victim's browser for whatever site the attacker wants. This applies to both persistent cookies and HTTP only cookies (unlike traditional XSS attacks).

An attacker is also able to use this technique to steal authentication credentials for sites that only encrypt the login form, but do not require a secure channel for the initial request to get to the page with the login form. Further the attacker is also able to steal any autocompletion information. This attack pattern can also be used to enable session fixation and cache poisoning attacks. Additional attacks can be enabled as well.

+ Attack Prerequisites
  • The victim and the attacker are both in an environment where an active man in the middle attack is possible (e.g., public WIFI hot spot)

    The victim visits at least one website that does not use TLS / SSL

+ Typical Severity

Medium

+ Attacker Skills or Knowledge Required

Skill or Knowledge Level: Low

Ability to intercept and modify requests / responses

Skill or Knowledge Level: Medium

Ability to create iFrame and JavaScript code that would initiate unauthorized requests to sensitive sites from the victim's browser

Skill or Knowledge Level: Medium

Solid understanding of the HTTP protocol

+ Solutions and Mitigations

Design: Tunnel communications through a secure proxy

Design: Trust level separation for privileged / non privileged interactions (e.g., two different browsers, two different users, two different operating systems, two different virtual machines)

+ References
[R.466.1] Roi Saltzman and Adi Sharabani. "Active Man in the Middle Attacks". IBM Rational Application Security Group. February 2, 2009. <http://blog.watchfire.com/wfblog/2009/02/active-man-in-the-middle-attacks.html>.
+ Content History
Submissions
SubmitterOrganizationDateSource
CAPEC Content TeamThe MITRE Corporation2014-06-23Internal_CAPEC_Team

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Page Last Updated or Reviewed: July 31, 2017