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Individual CAPEC Dictionary Definition (Release 1.1)
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Using Alternative IP Address Encodings | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| Attack Pattern ID | Pattern Abstraction: Detailed 4 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Typical Severity | High | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Description | Summary This attack relies on the attacker using unexpected formats for representing IP addresses. Networked applications may expect network location information in a specific format, such as fully qualified domains names, URL, IP address, or IP Address ranges. The issue that the attacker can exploit is that these design assumptions may not be validated against a variety of different possible encodings and network address location formats. Applications that use naming for creating policy namespaces for managing access control may be susceptible to queryin directly by IP addresses, which is ultimately a more generally authoritative way of communicating on a network. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Attack Prerequisites | The target software must fail to anticipate all of the possible valid encodings of an IP/web address. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Typical Likelihood of Exploit | Medium | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Methods of Attack |
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| Examples-Instances | Description
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| Attacker Skill or Knowledge Required | Low → The attacker has only to try IP address combinations. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Resources Required | Ability to communicate with server. Optionally, ability to capture output directly through synchronous communication or other method such as FTP. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Solutions and Mitigations | Design: Default deny access control policies Design: Input validation routines should check and enforce both input data types and content against a positive specification. In regards to IP addresses, this should include the authorized manner for the application to represent IP addresses and not accept user specified IP addresses and IP address formats (such as ranges) Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Attack Motivation- |
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| Context Description |
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| Injection Vector | Malicious input delivered through standard input | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Payload | Varies with instantiation of attack pattern. Malicious payload may be passed directly from appliation client, such as the web browser. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Activation Zone | Client machine and client network | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Payload Activation Impact | Enables attacker to view and access unexpected network services. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Related Weaknesses |
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| Purpose | Penetration | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| CIA Impact |
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| Technical Context |
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| References | G. Hoglund and G. McGraw. Exploiting Software: How to Break Code. Addison-Wesley, February 2004. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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