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CAPEC-230: Serialized Data with Nested Payloads

Attack Pattern ID: 230
Abstraction: Standard
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+ Description
Applications often need to transform data in and out of a data format (e.g., XML and YAML) by using a parser. It may be possible for an adversary to inject data that may have an adverse effect on the parser when it is being processed. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. By nesting these structures, causing the data to be repeatedly substituted, an adversary can cause the parser to consume more resources while processing, causing excessive memory consumption and CPU utilization.
+ Extended Description

An adversary's goal is to leverage parser failure to their advantage. In most cases this type of an attack will result in a Denial of Service due to an application becoming unstable, freezing, or crashing. However it may be possible to cause a crash resulting in arbitrary code execution, leading to a jump from the data plane to the control plane [REF-89].

This attack is most closely associated with web services using SOAP or a Rest API, because remote service requesters can post malicious payloads to the service provider. The main weakness is that the service provider generally must inspect, parse, and validate the messages to determine routing, workflow, security considerations, and so on. It is exactly these inspection, parsing, and validation routines that this attack targets. This attack exploits the loosely coupled nature of web services, where the service provider has little to no control over the service requester and any messages the service requester sends.

+ Alternate Terms

Term: XML Denial of Service (XML DoS)

+ Likelihood Of Attack

Medium

+ Typical Severity

High

+ Relationships
Section HelpThis table shows the other attack patterns and high level categories that are related to this attack pattern. These relationships are defined as ChildOf and ParentOf, and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as CanFollow, PeerOf, and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar attack patterns that the user may want to explore.
NatureTypeIDName
ChildOfMeta Attack PatternMeta Attack Pattern - A meta level attack pattern in CAPEC is a decidedly abstract characterization of a specific methodology or technique used in an attack. A meta attack pattern is often void of a specific technology or implementation and is meant to provide an understanding of a high level approach. A meta level attack pattern is a generalization of related group of standard level attack patterns. Meta level attack patterns are particularly useful for architecture and design level threat modeling exercises.130Excessive Allocation
ParentOfDetailed Attack PatternDetailed Attack Pattern - A detailed level attack pattern in CAPEC provides a low level of detail, typically leveraging a specific technique and targeting a specific technology, and expresses a complete execution flow. Detailed attack patterns are more specific than meta attack patterns and standard attack patterns and often require a specific protection mechanism to mitigate actual attacks. A detailed level attack pattern often will leverage a number of different standard level attack patterns chained together to accomplish a goal.197Exponential Data Expansion
ParentOfDetailed Attack PatternDetailed Attack Pattern - A detailed level attack pattern in CAPEC provides a low level of detail, typically leveraging a specific technique and targeting a specific technology, and expresses a complete execution flow. Detailed attack patterns are more specific than meta attack patterns and standard attack patterns and often require a specific protection mechanism to mitigate actual attacks. A detailed level attack pattern often will leverage a number of different standard level attack patterns chained together to accomplish a goal.491Quadratic Data Expansion
Section HelpThis table shows the views that this attack pattern belongs to and top level categories within that view.
+ Execution Flow
Explore
  1. An adversary determines the input data stream that is being processed by a data parser that supports using substitution on the victim's side.
Exploit
  1. An adversary crafts input data that may have an adverse effect on the operation of the parser when the data is parsed on the victim's system.
+ Prerequisites
An application's user-controllable data is expressed in a language that supports subsitution.
An application does not perform sufficient validation to ensure that user-controllable data is not malicious.
+ Indicators
Bad data is passed to the data parser (possibly repeatedly), possibly making it crash or execute arbitrary code.
+ Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the attack pattern. The Scope identifies the security property that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in their attack. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a pattern will be used to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
ScopeImpactLikelihood
Availability
Resource Consumption
Confidentiality
Read Data
Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Execute Unauthorized Commands
Confidentiality
Access Control
Authorization
Gain Privileges
+ Mitigations
Carefully validate and sanitize all user-controllable data prior to passing it to the data parser routine. Ensure that the resultant data is safe to pass to the data parser.
Perform validation on canonical data.
Pick a robust implementation of the data parser.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Section HelpCAPEC mappings to ATT&CK techniques leverage an inheritance model to streamline and minimize direct CAPEC/ATT&CK mappings. Inheritance of a mapping is indicated by text stating that the parent CAPEC has relevant ATT&CK mappings. Note that the ATT&CK Enterprise Framework does not use an inheritance model as part of the mapping to CAPEC.
Relevant to the ATT&CK taxonomy mapping (see parent )
+ References
[REF-89] Shlomo, Yona. "XML Parser Attacks: A summary of ways to attack an XML Parser". What is an XML Parser Attack?. 2007. <http://yeda.cs.technion.ac.il/~yona/talks/xml_parser_attacks/slides/slide2.html>.
+ Content History
Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2014-06-23
(Version 2.6)
CAPEC Content TeamThe MITRE Corporation
Modifications
Modification DateModifierOrganization
2019-09-30
(Version 3.2)
CAPEC Content TeamThe MITRE Corporation
Updated Alternate_Terms, Description, Execution_Flow, Indicators, Related_Attack_Patterns
2020-07-30
(Version 3.3)
CAPEC Content TeamThe MITRE Corporation
Updated Description
2021-06-24
(Version 3.5)
CAPEC Content TeamThe MITRE Corporation
Updated Related_Weaknesses
2021-10-21
(Version 3.6)
CAPEC Content TeamThe MITRE Corporation
Updated @Name, Description, Execution_Flow, Extended_Description, Indicators, Mitigations, Prerequisites, Skills_Required
Previous Entry Names
Change DatePrevious Entry Name
2021-10-21
(Version 3.6)
XML Nested Payloads
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Page Last Updated or Reviewed: October 21, 2021