Home > CAPEC List > CAPEC-146: XML Schema Poisoning (Version 3.0)  

CAPEC-146: XML Schema Poisoning

Attack Pattern ID: 146
Abstraction: Detailed
Status: Stable
Presentation Filter:
+ Description
An adversary corrupts or modifies the content of XML schema information passed between a client and server for the purpose of undermining the security of the target. XML Schemas provide the structure and content definitions for XML documents. Schema poisoning is the ability to manipulate a schema either by replacing or modifying it to compromise the programs that process documents that use this schema. Possible attacks are denial of service attacks by modifying the schema so that it does not contain required information for subsequent processing. For example, the unaltered schema may require a @name attribute in all submitted documents. If the adversary removes this attribute from the schema then documents created using the new grammar may lack this field, which may cause the processing application to enter an unexpected state or record incomplete data. In addition, manipulation of the data types described in the schema may affect the results of calculations taken by the document reader. For example, a float field could be changed to an int field. Finally, the adversary may change the encoding defined in the schema for certain fields allowing the contents to bypass filters that scan for dangerous strings. For example, the modified schema might us a URL encoding instead of ASCII, and a filter that catches a semicolon (;) might fail to detect its URL encoding (%3B).
+ Likelihood Of Attack

Low

+ Typical Severity

High

+ Relationships

The table(s) below shows the other attack patterns and high level categories that are related to this attack pattern. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as CanFollow, PeerOf, and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar attack patterns that the user may want to explore.

+ Relevant to the view "Mechanisms of Attack" (CAPEC-1000)
NatureTypeIDName
ChildOfStandard Attack PatternStandard Attack Pattern - A standard level attack pattern in CAPEC is focused on a specific methodology or technique used in an attack. It is often seen as a singular piece of a fully executed attack. A standard attack pattern is meant to provide sufficient details to understand the specific technique and how it attempts to accomplish a desired goal. A standard level attack pattern is a specific type of a more abstract meta level attack pattern.271Schema Poisoning
+ Prerequisites
Some level of access to modify the target schema.
The schema used by the target application must be improperly secured against unauthorized modification and manipulation.
+ Resources Required
Access to the schema and the knowledge and ability modify it. Ability to replace or redirect access to the modified schema.
+ Consequences

The table below specifies different individual consequences associated with the attack pattern. The Scope identifies the security property that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in their attack. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a pattern will be used to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.

ScopeImpactLikelihood
Availability
Unreliable Execution
Resource Consumption
Integrity
Modify Data
Confidentiality
Read Data
+ Mitigations
Design: Protect the schema against unauthorized modification.
Implementation: For applications that use a known schema, use a local copy or a known good repository instead of the schema reference supplied in the XML document. Additionally, ensure that the proper permissions are set on local files to avoid unauthorized modification.
Implementation: For applications that leverage remote schemas, use the HTTPS protocol to prevent modification of traffic in transit and to avoid unauthorized modification.
+ Example Instances

XML Schema Poisoning Attacks can often occur locally due to being embedded within the XML document itself or being located on the host within an improperaly protected file. In these cases, the adversary can simply edit the XML schema without the need for additional privileges. An example of the former can be seen below:

<?xml version="1.0"?> <!DOCTYPE contact [ <!ELEMENT contact (name,phone,email,address)> <!ELEMENT name (#PCDATA)> <!ELEMENT phone (#PCDATA)> <!ELEMENT email (#PCDATA)> <!ELEMENT address (#PCDATA)> ]> <note> <name>John Smith</name> <phone>555-1234</phone> <email>jsmith@email.com</email> <address>1 Example Lane</address> </note></capec:Code>

If the 'name' attribute is required in all submitted documents and this field is removed by the adversary, the application may enter an unexpected state or record incomplete data. Additionally, if this data is needed to perform additional functions, a Denial of Service (DOS) may occur.

XML Schema Poisoning Attacks can also be executed remotely if the HTTP protocol is being used to transport data. :

<?xml version="1.0"?> <!DOCTYPE contact SYSTEM "http://example.com/contact.dtd"[ <note> <name>John Smith</name> <phone>555-1234</phone> <email>jsmith@email.com</email> <address>1 Example Lane</address> </note></capec:Code>

The HTTP protocol does not encrypt the traffic it transports, so all communication occurs in plaintext. This traffic can be observed and modified by the adversary during transit to alter the XML schema before it reaches the end user. The adversary can perform a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attack to alter the schema in the same way as the previous example and to acheive the same results.

+ Content History
Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2014-06-23CAPEC Content TeamThe MITRE Corporation
Modifications
Modification DateModifierOrganization
2017-01-09CAPEC Content TeamThe MITRE Corporation
Updated Description Summary
2018-07-31CAPEC Content TeamThe MITRE Corporation
Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit

More information is available — Please select a different filter.
Page Last Updated or Reviewed: July 31, 2018